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751 26 UPPSALA
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My research interests are in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, with a focus on the nature of reference in language and thought. From January 2019 I hold a Burman fellowship at Uppsala University. I am PI of the VR-funded project New Frontiers of Speech: Philosophy of Language in the Information Age (2020-2022). I received my PhD from the University of California, Los Angeles (USA) in 2012 and docentship from University of Turku (Finland) in 2015.
Finns även på
1. "Why We Should Keep Talking about Fake News" with E. Michaelson and R. Sterken, Inquiry, 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562372
2. "The Problem of First-Person Aboutness", Croatian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XIX, No. 57, 2019.
3. “Principles of Acquaintance,” in J. Knowles and T. Raleigh, eds., New Essays on Acquaintance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019.
4. "What's New About Fake News?" with E. Michaelson and R. Sterken, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Volume XVI, Issue 2, 2019.
5. "The Aesthetic Significance of the Lying-Misleading Distinction," British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 59, Issue 3, 2019.
7. "The Flexibility of the Speaker's Reference-Semantic Reference Distinction," to appear in a memorial volume of Synthese for Jaakko Hintikka, J. Almog and G. Sandu, eds., forthcoming.
8. “The Referential Unity of (Pro-) Nominals in Ordinary English,” co-authored with Joseph Almog, to appear in J. Pepp and J. Almog, eds., Sense, Reference and Use—Afterthoughts on Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
9. Sense, Reference and Use—Afterthoughts on Kaplan. co-edited with J. Almog. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
10. “On Pictorially Mediated Mind-Object Relations," Inquiry, 2019. DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562372.
11. “Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating,” in S. Goldberg, ed., The Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190675233.013.40
12. “Truth Serum, Liar Serum, and Some Problems about Saying what You Think is False,” in E. Michaelson and A. Stokke, eds., Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
13. “What Determines the Reference of Names? What Determines the Objects of Thought.” Erkenntnis, 2018. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-018-0048-y
14. “A Unified Treatment of (Pro-) Nominals in Ordinary English,” co-authored with Joseph Almog and Paul Nichols, in A. Bianchi, ed., On Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
15. Locating Semantic Reference. UCLA Ph.D. Dissertation (doctoral thesis), 2012. Available online: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3z15t80z
16. “Reference and Referring: A Framework,” in W. Kabasenche, M. O’Rourke, and M. Slater, eds., Reference and Referring. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012.
17. “Semantic Reference Not By Convention?” Abstracta – Linguagem, Mente e Ação. Volume 5 Number 2, 2009.
18. “Two Conceptions of Semantic Reference,” Proceedings of ILCLI International Workshop on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Rhetoric, The University of the Basque Country Press (EHU Press), 2009.
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