Andrew Reisner

senior lecturer at Department of Philosophy, Practical Philosophy; Academic Staff

Email:
andrew.reisner[AT-sign]filosofi.uu.se
Telephone:
+4618-471 7352
Visiting address:
Room EP 2-3054 Engelska parken, Thunbergsv. 3 H
Postal address:
Box 627
751 26 UPPSALA

Also available at

My courses

Biography

My first post in philosophy was as a visiting assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins University. After that I was an assistant and then associate professor at McGill University. I joined the department here at Uppsala in autumn 2015. My first degree was in classics from Middlebury College, after which I read for an M.A. in philosophy at Bristol University and then a D.Phil in Philosophy at Oxford University. I have held visiting fellowships or lectureships at the ANU, the CSMN, Lund University, Oxford University, and Stockholm University. My primary research interests are in theoretical and practical reason and value theory.

Publications

Books (edited)

Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, a co-edited volume with Iwao Hirose. Oxford University Press: Oxford (2015).

Reasons for Belief, a co-edited volume with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2011).

Journal Articles and Book Chapters

& Michaelson, Eliot. ‘Fish’ in The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, Anne Barnhill, Mark Budoflson, and Tyler Doggett (eds.), Oxford University Press: Oxford (forthcoming).
‘Two Theses about the Distinctness of Theoretical and Practical Normativity’ in Normativity: Epistemic and Practical, Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way, and Daniel Whiting (eds.), Oxford University Press: Oxford (forthcoming).
‘Pragmatic Reasons for Belief’. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Normativity and Reasons. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
‘Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against’. In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter (2016).
& Van Weelden, Joseph. ‘Moral Reasons for Moral Beliefs: A Puzzle for Moral Testimony Pessimism’. Logos and Episteme (VI): 429-448 (2015).
‘Fittingness, Value, and trans-World Attitudes’. Philosophical Quarterly (260): 1-22 (2015).

“Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity”, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).

“Preface” with Iwao Hirose, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).

‘A Short Refutation of Strict Evidentialism’. Inquiry (5):1-9 (2014).

'Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?', Organon F, 20, no 4, special volume on the enkratic principle (2013), pp 436-462.

'Leaps of Knowledge' in The Aim of Belief, Timothy Chan (ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), pp 167-183.

'Is there Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?', Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 34-53.

'Introduction' with Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen in Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 1-10.

'Metaethics for Everyone'. Problema, 4, special volume on the philosophy Ronald Dworkin (2010), pp 39-64.

'Abandoning the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value'. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12, 4, 2009, pp.379-395.

'Unifying the Requirements of Rationality'. Philosophical Explorations Special Volume 12:3 (Practical Reasoning).

'The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'. Philosophical Studies, 145, 2, 2009, pp.257-272.

'Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief'. Philosophical Studies, 138, 1, 2008, pp.17-27.

'Does Friendship Give us non-Derivative Partial Reasons?'. Les ateliers de l’éthique, 3, 1, 2007, pp.70-79.

'Evidentialism and the Numbers Game'. Theoria, 78, 4, 2007, pp.304-16.

Book Reviews

Review of The Domain of Reasons (2011, OUP) by John Skorupski. For Philosophical Review, 122 (3), (2013), pp. 661-664.

Encyclopedia Entries

Prima Facie and Pro Tanto Oughts’, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, London: Blackwells (2013).

‘John Broome’, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015).

Unpublished Cited Works

Why Rational Requirements Are Not Normative Requirements

Anchoring Diachronic Rationality

Publications

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