senior lecturer at Department of Philosophy, Practical Philosophy; Academic Staff
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My first post in philosophy was as a visiting assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins University. After that I was an assistant and then associate professor at McGill University. I joined the department here at Uppsala in autumn 2015. My first degree was in classics from Middlebury College, after which I read for an M.A. in philosophy at Bristol University and then a D.Phil in Philosophy at Oxford University. I have held visiting fellowships or lectureships at the ANU, the CSMN, Lund University, Oxford University, and Stockholm University. My primary research interests are in theoretical and practical reason and value theory.
Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, a co-edited volume with Iwao Hirose. Oxford University Press: Oxford (2015).
Reasons for Belief, a co-edited volume with Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2011).
Journal Articles and Book Chapters
“Normative Conflicts and the Structure of Normativity”, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).
“Preface” with Iwao Hirose, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome, Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2015).
‘A Short Refutation of Strict Evidentialism’. Inquiry (5):1-9 (2014).
'Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?', Organon F, 20, no 4, special volume on the enkratic principle (2013), pp 436-462.
'Leaps of Knowledge' in The Aim of Belief, Timothy Chan (ed), Oxford: Oxford University Press (2013), pp 167-183.
'Is there Reason to Be Theoretically Rational?', Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 34-53.
'Introduction' with Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen in Reasons for Belief, Andrew Reisner and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp 1-10.
'Metaethics for Everyone'. Problema, 4, special volume on the philosophy Ronald Dworkin (2010), pp 39-64.
'Abandoning the Buck-Passing Analysis of Final Value'. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12, 4, 2009, pp.379-395.
'Unifying the Requirements of Rationality'. Philosophical Explorations Special Volume 12:3 (Practical Reasoning).
'The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'. Philosophical Studies, 145, 2, 2009, pp.257-272.
'Weighing Pragmatic and Evidential Reasons for Belief'. Philosophical Studies, 138, 1, 2008, pp.17-27.
'Does Friendship Give us non-Derivative Partial Reasons?'. Les ateliers de l’éthique, 3, 1, 2007, pp.70-79.
'Evidentialism and the Numbers Game'. Theoria, 78, 4, 2007, pp.304-16.
Review of The Domain of Reasons (2011, OUP) by John Skorupski. For Philosophical Review, 122 (3), (2013), pp. 661-664.
‘Prima Facie and Pro Tanto Oughts’, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, London: Blackwells (2013).
‘John Broome’, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015).
Unpublished Cited Works
Why Rational Requirements Are Not Normative Requirements
Anchoring Diachronic Rationality
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